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INTRODUCTION

It is unfortunate that counsel for the McLaughlins has
chosen the Respondent's Brief as a forum for making defamatory
allegations which are either (1) disputed by Mr. Perry as shown
in the Record, (2) contrary to the undisputed facts in the
Record, or (3) wholly without support in the Record.

Mr. Perry

is a caring and loving grandfather to his daughter's two sons,
Shaun and Dustin, and has throughout these proceedings acted in
their best interests.

However, Mr. Perry is not under a duty

to act for the benefit of his deceased daughter's ex-husband
and his new wife.

The underlying dispute in this case is

between Mr. Perry and his ex-son in law and wife —

not between

Mr. Perry and his two grandsons.
Rather than clutter the Reply Brief with irrelevant and
unnecessary detail, but in order to inform the Court fully of
the manner in which counsel for the McLaughlins has distorted
the facts in the Record before the Court, Mr. Perry has
provided an appendix to this Reply Brief.

In addition to

allegations disputed as part of the argument section, the
appendix sets forth other erroneous allegations contained in
the McLaughlins' Respondent's Brief and provides Mr. Perry's
response.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.
THE KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THE MCLAUGHLINS WERE
INTERESTED PERSONS FOR PURPOSES OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH HEARING
The McLaughlins argue summarily that Subsection 75-1-302(2)
gave the probate court power to enter an order granting
affirmative relief to the McLaughlins even though they are not
interested persons.

Utah Code Ann. §

Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.

75-1-302(2) (1978).

That Subsection provides:

(2) The court has full power to make orders,
judgments, and decrees and take all other action
necessary and proper to administer justice in the
matters that come before it.
Id.; emphasis added.

The McLaughlins have overlooked the

importance of the underlined words.

The probate court must

have jurisdiction to hear a matter or that matter cannot "come
before it."

As the Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-1-106

succinctly states:

"When resort to the judge is necessary or

desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain protection, the scope
of the proceeding if not otherwise prescribed by the Code is
framed by the petition."

See generally, discussion in

Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24.

Mr. Perry's petition requested

that the court approve the sale to the Arnauds.

He did not ask

the court to enter an order selling the property to the
McLaughlins.
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that
the probate court does not have jurisdiction to grant
affirmative relief to a non interested person.

Matter of

Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1986).

In order to

succeed on this appeal, the McLaughlins must establish that
they were both interested persons.

Unless they can do this,

the probate court was without jurisdictional authority to grant
them affirmative relief.

See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-18.

ii. THE MCLAUGHLINS HAVE IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MRS.
MCLAUGHLIN WAS NOT AN INTERESTED PERSON
The McLaughlins1 Respondent's Brief speaks at length to the
question of whether Kent McLaughlin is an interested person.
See generally, Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-15.

However, there

is not one single reference to Carol McLaughlin and any claim
she may have to be an interested person.

This simply reflects

the fact that Carol McLaughlin does not qualify as an
interested person under any part of the definition.
Ann, §

Utah Code

75-1-201(20) (1978).

Mrs. McLaughlin moved the probate court for and was granted
affirmative relief at the hearing on November 6, 1985.
(R.378).

The probate court's order of December 3, 1985, which

Mr. Perry attacks as being void, states in part:

- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(T)he former spouse of the decedent and his spouse,
Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin, were present in person
and represented by their attorney, E.H. Fankhauser;
and the Court . . . called for higher and better bids;
and Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin, having submitted to
the Court their offer to purchase the real property
and the furnishings . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED . . . .
The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin
to purchase the real property . . . is approved . .
The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol
McLaughlin to purchase personal property . . . is
approved . . . .
(R.77-78); see also (R.378:18-22).

Thus, Mrs. McLaughlin was

an integral part of the offer and was granted affirmative
relief by the probate court.

As explained in Mr. Perry's

Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-18, the probate court lacked
jurisdictional authority to grant Mrs McLaughlin affirmative
relief.

Its order granting affirmative relief is thus void and

should be vacated.

in. KENT MCLAUGHLIN WAS NOT AN INTERESTED PERSON FOR
PURPOSES OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH HEARING
The McLaughlins suggest that the probate court made a
finding of fact that Kent McLaughlin was an "interested
person."

Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.

The McLaughlins

further argue that the probate court's alleged finding can only
be set aside if an abuse of discretion is shown.

- 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent's

Brief, p.12.

The probate court never made a finding of fact

that Mr. McLaughlin was an interested person.

See the court's

orders of December 3, 1985 (R.77-81), of March 12, 1986
(R.190-192) and of July 9, 1986 (R.293-294).

Moreover, the

correct standard for reviewing a finding of fact by the trial
court is not abuse of discretion; it is whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's
finding, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding.
Scharf v. BGM Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

The McLaughlins Now Argue They Appeared As Fiduciaries
For Shaun and Dustin
Mr. Perry's Appellant's Brief already addresses and
disposes of the argument that Kent McLaughlin's $2,500
equitable interest in Diane's home provided a sufficient
interest to permit him to bid on Diane's home and furnishings
at the November 6, 1985 hearing.
15-16.

See Appellant's Brief, pp.

The McLaughlins now argue that Kent McLaughlin was also

an interested person because he appeared at the November 6,
1985 hearing as the natural guardian of, and thus a fiduciary
on behalf of, Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin, Diane's sole heirs
under Utah law.

Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-15.

does not support this allegation.
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The Record

The McLaughlins Did Not Advise The Court They
Were Appearing As Fiduciaries
When, the matter was called, the McLaughlins, through their
counsel, offerred to purchase the real and personal property.
Counsel for the McLaughlins argued that the probate court
should accept the McLaughlins' offer solely on the basis that
it was a better offer for the estate.

(R.371-373).

At the end

of the hearing, counsel for the McLaughlins represented to the
court that Mr. McLaughlin would purchase the personal property
and give it to Shaun and Dustin.

(R.383).

But when counsel

for the McLaughlins prepared his proposed order, there were no
representations that the McLaughlins were acting in a fiduciary
capacity nor were there any restrictions on the McLaughlins'
use of the property once purchased.

(R.72-75).

Under the

order prepared by their counsel, the McLaughlins became
absolute owners of the property and were free to use it for
their benefit as they saw fit.

The McLaughlins Did Not Argue This Position
When The Issue Was Raised With The Probate Court
Moreover, the McLaughlins did not make this allegation when
Mr. Perry raised the issue with the probate court.

- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When Mr.

Perry filed his Rule 59 motion, the central issue in that
motion was whether the McLaughlins were "interested persons."
(R.200-201, 283-288).

Counsel for the McLaughlins filed a

memorandum in opposition to Mr. Perry's Rule 59 motion,
(R.253-261), and he also argued against Mr. Perry's Rule 59
motion at the hearing before Judge Hanson.

(R.388-413).

Counsel for the McLaughlins argued at length that Kent
McLaughlin was an interested person.

(R.256-258, 398-402).

However, the only basis argued to the probate court was that
Mr. McLaughlin had an equitable interest in Diane's home.
There is not one single reference in either the memorandum or
the oral argument to the allegation Mr. McLaughlin now makes
that he was representing the interests of Shaun and Dustin as
their natural guardian.

Mr. McLaughlin Acted Contrary To The Interests
Of His Sons By Demanding Payment Of His Equitable Lien
Finally, while Mr. McLaughlin now characterizes his
attendance at the November 6th hearing as an effort to protect
his sons' interests, the only action taken by Mr. McLaughlin
prior to the hearing was contrary to the interests of his
sons.

Mr. McLaughlin objected to Mr. Perry's petition in

writing —

not on the grounds that the home and furnishings
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were being sold to a third party —

but rather on the grounds

that Mr. McLaughlin would not waive his $2,500 equitable lien
in Diane's home.

(R.55-56).

When the home was sold to the

Arnauds in December, 1985, Mr. McLaughlin collected the entire
amount of his equitable interest.

(R.241).

Had Mr. McLaughlin

waived his lien in the home as he had once stated he would, his
sons -- the only beneficiaries of the estate —
enriched by $2,500.00.

would have been

Instead, Mr. McLaughlin demanded full

payment of the equitable interest contrary to the interests of
his sons —
protect.

the persons he now claims he appeared in court to
(R.14).

Thus, the Record shows that the McLaughlins were acting in
their individual capacities, for their own interest, and not as
fiduciaries for Shaun and Dustin.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Since neither of the McLaughlins are interested persons,
the probate court exceeded its jurisdictional authority when it
granted affirmative relief to them pursuant to the December 3,
1985 Order.

An order entered in excess of the probate court's

jurisdictional authority is void.

When a party petitions the

court to vacate a void order under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (1985), the court must vacate the

- 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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order if it is void.

The probate court erred when it refused

to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order.

Mr. Perry respectfully

requests that the Court reverse the probate court's order of
March 12, 1986 refusing to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order
and remand the case to the probate court with instructions to
vacate the December 3, 1985 Order.
Dated this

j?

day of

N^Z^

, 1987,
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

(^CW^ H^f^i^jf
Chltrles M. Benn^t
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry,
Personal Representative of the
Estate
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APPENDIX

Unfounded and Incorrect Allegations of the McLaughlins
and Mr. Perry's Response.
1.

Mr. Perry said that he would sell Diane's home.
a.

The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry told Kent

McLaughlin he would not sell either Diane's home or the
personal property in the home.

They also allege that Mr. Perry

promised Shaun and Dustin he would not sell the furniture and
personal property.
b.

Respondent's Brief, p.3.

Mr. Perry responds that he never told Mr.

McLaughlin that he would not sell the home and the
furnishings.

In fact, Mr. Perry petitioned the court for

approval of the sale and Mr. McLaughlin's waiver of his
equitable lien on the house and sent notice to Mr. McLaughlin.
(R.44).

While there have been many references to Mr.

McLaughlin's oral waiver of his equitable lien by his counsel
(see, e.g., R.398), Mr. McLaughlin has never disputed that a
conversation took place with Mr. Perry concerning the waiver of
his lien.

If Mr. Perry told Mr. McLaughlin that Mr. Perry

would not sell the home, there would have been no need for Mr.
Perry to discuss with Mr. McLaughlin the waiver of Mr.
McLaughlin's lien.

- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Perry did not tell Shaun and Dustin he would not
sell the home and furnishings.

Rather, he expressly told them

that he was selling the home and furniture.

Before selling the

home, he made at least two formal tours of the home with Shaun
and Dustin and made sure that they received all of the personal
property items in the house they wanted or needed.

(R.230).

2.
The McLaughlins appeared at the November 6th hearing
in their individual capacities
a.

The McLaughlins allege that Mr. McLaughlin

appeared at the November 6, 1985 hearing as the natural
guardian of and a fiduciary for Shaun and Dustin.

Respondent's

Brief, p.13.
b.

Mr. Perry responds that there is no support in

the Record for this allegation.

In addition to the facts set

forth in Point III above, the court should note:
1)

When Mr. McLaughlin was divorced from Diane,

the court ordered him to pay Diane $300.00 per month
in child support for the benefit of Shaun and Dustin.
(R.51).

Mr. McLaughlin was consistently delinquent in

his child support obligations.

As of January 10,

1984, Mr. McLaughlin owed Diane $5,800.00 in past due
child support payments, $1,600.00 of which was owed
pursuant to a judgment entered on May 7, 1981.
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R.50).

2)

In order to obtain the benefit of the

court's award of child support to her, Diane executed
an agreement with Mr. McLaughlin on January 10, 1984.
(R.50-53).

The agreement provided that Diane would

purchase Mr. McLaughlin's equitable lien in Diane's
home for a total price of $13,380.00.

Diane was

credited with the $5,800.00 in past due child support
against the purchase price.

It was agreed that Diane

would "pay" for the remaining $7,580.00 by waiving
future child support at the rate of $300 per month.
(R.50).

Thus, by the time of Diane's death, Mr.

McLaughlin's equitable lien had been reduced to
approximately $2,500.

3.
Mr. Perry required the McLaughlins to abide by the
Court's order in purchasing Diane's home.
a.

The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry

intentionally frustrated their efforts to purchase the home and
imply that this was the reason the McLaughlins were unable to
purchase the home.
b.

Respondent's Brief, p. 5.

Mr. Perry responds that on December 6, 1985,

counsel for Mr. Perry learned that the McLaughlins intended to
purchase Diane's home without formally assuming the underlying

- 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mortgage.

(R. 238-239).

The net effect of the McLaughlins'

plan would have been that the estate would no longer have owned
the home, but the estate would have remained liable on the
mortgage.

(R.239).

That obviously was not the "better" offer

that the McLaughlins represented to the probate court that they
were making.

(R. 371-373).

Moreover, the McLaughlins' plan

violated the express terms of paragraph 3b of the Court's
December 3, 1985 Order:

"Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol

McLaughlin are to pay the personal representative . . .
follows:

as

$18,500 representing the approximate balance of an

existing mortgage to be assumed by the [McLaughlins].
emphasis added).

(R.79;

The sole reason the McLaughlins were unable

to purchase the home was because Mr. Perry insisted that they
do so in accordance with the Court's Order.

(R.239).

4.
The Court ordered Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin to purchase
the property; the McLaughlins violated the Court's Order
a.

The McLaughlins allege that the Court's Order of

December 3, 1985 required Mr. Perry to sell the property to Mr.
McLaughlin.
b.

Respondent's Brief, p.10.
Mr. Perry responds that, in addition to the

points made above, the McLaughlins misstate the Record when
they say that the Court ordered a sale to Mr. McLaughlin.

- 13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

Order required Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin to purchase the home and
furnishings by December 1, 1985.

The order was unconditional.

It did not contemplate or provide for any disposition of the
property in the event the McLaughlins violated the order by
attempting to purchase only the furnishings and failing to
purchase the home.

(R.77-81).

5.
The McLaughlins did not object to a sale of the home
and furnishings to third parties.
a.

The McLaughlins allege that at a meeting

following the hearing on Mr. Perry's petition to sell the home
(approximately November 6, 1985), they advised Mr. Perry that
Shaun, Dustin and the McLaughlins did not want the home and
furnishings sold to a third party.
b.

Respondent's Brief, p.5.

Mr. Perry responds that the McLaughlins made no

such statements at the meeting.

In addition to Mr.

McLaughlin's oral waiver of his equitable interest (see
paragraph 1 above), this is shown by what took place after that
meeting.
After this meeting, counsel for the McLaughlins
prepared a proposed order, and Mr. Perry objected to the order
and filed his own order and a memorandum in support of that
order.

(R. 66-71).

A copy of Mr. Perry's order and memorandum

- 14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was mailed to counsel for the McLaughlins on November 27,
1985.

(R.82).

In the memorandum, counsel for Mr. Perry argued

that the court's order should not reserve jurisdiction of the
case if the McLaughlins failed to close on the property on or
before December 1, 1985, as ordered.
memorandum stated:

(R.68).

Furthermore, the

"If the McLaughlins are not able to close

on or before December 1, 1985, the Personal Representative [Mr.
Perry] will sell the property to the Arnauds."
added).

(R.69; emphasis

Notwithstanding this unequivocable statement and the

McLaughlins alleged opposition to the sale of the home and
furnishings to third parties, the McLaughlins neither objected
to nor made any efforts to stop the sale to the Arnauds until
after the sale was completed.

(R.122-123, 126-127).

Counsel

for the McLaughlins filed an ex parte motion for and an order
to show cause on December 24, 1985.

(R.122-123, 126-127).

Counsel for the McLaughlins avers that he was told on December
9, 1985 that the furniture and home would be sold to the
Arnauds and that he learned the sale was completed on December
13, 1985.

(R.171-172).

6.
The property sold to the Arnauds was not
"sentimental"; Shaun and Dustin took from their mother's home
the property they wanted

- 15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a.

The McLaughlins allege that "Shaun and Dustin

wanted the home and furniture to remain in the family for
sentimental reasons . . . ."
b.

Respondent's Brief, p.9.

Mr. Perry responds that if the McLaughlins

appeared at the November 6th hearing for the purpose of
preserving the home and furniture for Shaun and Dustin and
protecting their sentiments, why did they not disclose that to
the court?

Indeed, rather than bidding for the property, the

McLaughlins could have simply objected to any sale under any
circumstances.

If no sale had occurred, the home and

furnishings would have ultimately been distributed to the
conservator for the benefit of Shaun and Dustin.

An objection

to the sale of the home and furnishings on the basis that the
beneficiaries wanted the property would have been granted as a
matter of course.
Moreover, the Court should review the list of
furnishings that were sold.

(R.54).

It included such

sentimental memorabilia as "1 portable dishwasher, 1 end table,
1 large lamp, 1 washer, 1 dryer, various metal braces, [and]
wood shelving."

(R.54).

Mr. Perry suggests that the real

reason behind the McLaughlins efforts to secure the furnishings
for themselves (while not closing on the home) was their
recognition that the price placed on the furnishings was
artificially low.

(R.263).
- 16 -
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The Arnauds originally made a single offer to
purchase the home and furnishings together.

Counsel for Mr.

Perry advised the Arnauds to resubmit their offer and to place
a separate value on the home and a separate value on the
furnishings.

The price for the furnishings was set without an

appraisal as an accomodation to the Arnauds in obtaining FHA
financing for the purchase of the home.

(R.105-106).

Since

the Arnauds could not borrow money from the FHA to purchase the
furniture, they naturally set the price of the furniture as low
as possible.
Finally, Mr. Perry took Shaun and Dustin through the home
on at least two formal occasions.
wanted or needed.

They took everything they

(R.230).

7.
Judge Hanson followed the procedure set forth in the
repealed probate code section at the November 6th hearing
a.

The McLaughlins allege that Judge Hanson was

concerned for the estate and the interested parties at the
hearing held on November 6, 1985, and that his decision to
allow Mr. McLaughlin to bid as an interested person was founded
on these concerns.
b.

Respondent's Brief, p.12.

Mr. Perry responds that Judge Hanson's only

concern was with the issue of which offer was "better", and he
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had no concern for the parties making the offers.

When Mr.

Perry requested that the McLaughlins be required to pay a
larger down payment than the Arnauds had made, Judge Hanson
responded:

No. I think the money is appropriate. I don't know
the Arnauds any more than I know the McLaughlins. I
have no reason to think that either would not
perform. The better bid, and equal in dollars, equal
in initial offer comes from the McLaughlins, and they
can close in the same time proposed.
(R.381).

Judge Hanson viewed his responsibilities solely in

terms of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978;
repealed 1983) —
bid.

to determine which was the higher and better

There was no discussion at the hearing of whether Mr.

McLaughlin or his wife were interested persons.

(See,

R.369-388).

8.
Mr. Perry has not breached his duties deliberately or
otherwise.
a.

The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry

deliberately breached his fiduciary duties and disregarded a
order of the Court by selling the home and furnishings to the
Arnauds.

Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 14.
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b.

Mr. Perry responds that he does not believe that

he violated the probate court's order of December 3, 1985. The
order itself refers 6 times to a single "offer to purchase the
real property and the furnishings", not a separate offer to
purchase the real property and a separate offer to purchase the
personal property.

(R.78)

Mr. Perry acted only after

receiving advice from counsel that he was free to sell to the
Arnauds in view of the McLaughlins' undisputable violation of
the December 3, 1985 Order (they failed to close on the home by
December 1, 1985 as ordered to do). (R.233).

Even if it is

ultimately determined that Mr. Perry violated the December 3,
1985 Order, he certainly was not "deliberate[ly] breach[ing]
[his] trust" (Respondent's Brief, p.10) nor was he
"disregard[ing] the lawful order of the court" (Respondent's
Brief, p.14).

See also, R.205-213 (Mr. Perry's memorandum in

support of his petition to quash the order to show cause which
sets forth his defense to the claim he breached the order).

9.

There have been no extra expenses in the Delta lawsuit

a.

The McLaughlins allege that counsel for Mr. Perry

has caused added expenses to the estate by pursuing duplicative
lawsuits against Delta Air Lines.

Respondent's Brief, pp.3-4.
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b.
expenses.

Mr. Perry responds that there have been no added
Originally, one lawsuit (and one complaint) was

filed against Delta Air Lines.

The conservator for Shaun and

Dustin asserted the survival claims and the personal
representative of the estate asserted the wrongful death
claims.

See In Re Delta Air Crash, August 2, 1985, MDL 657,

United States District Court, Northern District in Fort Worth,
Texas.

The contingency agreement operates against the entire

recovery.

(R.28-31).

The total expenses would be identical if

either the conservator or the personal representative had
asserted all of the claims against Delta.

Moreover, Mr. Perry

petitioned the probate court for approval of the agreement.
(R.24-32).

Notice of this hearing was sent to Mr. McLaughlin's

home (R.22-backside of page), and he neither appeared at the
hearing or objected to the granting of the petition.

CDN5026B
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(R.63).
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